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1 Nowadays  philosophers  as  intellectuals
are strongly encouraged to be more active
on their cultural scene and particularly to
direct  their  efforts  towards  creating  or
reconstructing  possible  bridges of
communication. As is well known, some of
the distances between intellectual worlds
are often matters of ‘styles of writing,’ as
well  as  socio-historical  controversies
which can be reconsidered in a different
light at successive generational readings.
In  this  view,  both  historical  and
theoretical  tools  are  important  for
‘rereading’  and  ‘rethinking’  theories
which  undeniably  have  had  great
“influence and impact on our culture and
institutions.”  The  very  harsh  critiques
that  Pragmatists  received  from  all  over
the  world,  especially  in  the  first  half  of
the 20th century, may be more the result
of  obstinate  misunderstandings  than  of
concrete  incommunicability.  As  an  example,  John  Dewey  criticizes  the  ‘wishful
thinking’ caricature of William James’s work as arising from the lack of imagination of
his readers (LW 15: 15). Robert A. Schwartz made a serious attempt to re-think and re-
activate the interest for some of the issues raised by James in Pragmatism. A New Name
for  Some Old  Ways  of  Thinking (James 1907).  His  theoretical  efforts  are influenced by
Nelson Goodman’s and W. V. O. Quine’s epistemologies and he is truly sympathetic to
Pragmatism and the American philosophical tradition. Despite his original intention to
explore classical American Pragmatists’  main themes, considering their implications
for  contemporary  issues  in  ‘epistemology,’  ‘language’  and  ‘metaphysics,’  Schwartz
decided to narrow and deepen his analysis; he focused upon the book by the author
who may be recognized worldwide as the “spokesperson” of Pragmatism, being “the
intellectual pivot of the movement, looking back to C. S. Peirce and pointing ahead to
Dewey” (4). Bearing Peirce and particularly Dewey in mind, his work may thus be read
as  an  intense  conversation  with  James  about  his  Pragmatist  account  of  ‘inquiry,’
‘language’ and ‘truth.’ 
2 The primary goal of Schwartz’s lecture-by-lecture commentary on James’s 1907 work is
“to explain and explore the implications of Pragmatic ideas, not to defend or criticize
them” (5). Carrying on his analysis, he points out that he “looks ahead, not back”; that
is to say that his way to rethink issues James unfolded throughout his presentations is
to consider them in the light of more contemporary debates. Evidently, each chapter of
Schwartz’s book focuses upon one lecture of Pragmatism, and from titles of the chapters
the reader can understand the line of his interpretation of James’s lectures. This choice
is a revelation of his intense personal involvement with James’s views, and that is what
makes this book so challenging for Pragmatism scholars.
3 Before  addressing  the  first  lecture,  there  is  a  brief  chapter  in  which  the  author
recollects the themes he considers to be in the background of the Pragmatists’ ideas. As
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is well known, their approach to philosophical inquiry was that of the scientific method
– according to James the empiricist tendency was the most diffused mentality of his times
–  being  also  deeply  influenced  by  A.  Bain’s  psychology  and  C.  Darwin’s  theory  of
evolution, which suggested “both the biological and the mental continuity of species”
(10).  Despite  this,  the  Pragmatists’  anti-Cartesianism  and  fallibilistic  stance,  their
attention to behavior as well as their insistence upon functions, should not be easy
labelled or misunderstood. More specifically, Schwartz acknowledges James’s original
interest  in  individual  experiences  with  respect  to  Peirce’s  and  Dewey’s  work,  and
shares the mainstream interpretation of his study of the function of our minds in his
Principles of Psychology (James 1890) as in deep continuity with his epistemological and
metaphysical  positions.  Interesting  references  to  Peirce  and Dewey,  and contextual
connections  for  instance  to  T.  Kuhn,  J.  L.  Austin  and  Quine,  are  pertinently  given
throughout the book, which also offers cross-references to James’s other main works.
4 Commenting on James’s most famous lectures, and staying future-oriented, the author
aims to corroborate his view of James as “an epistemic and meaning holist” (115) as
well as a fallibilist, a radical pluralist and a “pragmatist instrumentalist” (86). In this
view,  ‘The  Place  of  Values  in  Inquiry’  is  a  deep  reading  of  James’s  first  lecture  of
Pragmatism.  The influence of  ‘temperaments’  or  ‘sentiments,’  he  argues,  “cannot  be
ignored without  distorting the  nature  of  objective  inquiry”  (20).  Schwartz  suggests
here close similarities with Quine’s and Goodman’s references to ‘aesthetic preference’
and ‘philosophic conscience.’ Moreover, if James is talking about different ‘philosophies
of inquiry,’ in this respect then his view can also be compared to Kuhn’s “Paradigms, as
James’s ‘philosophies,’  are not themselves theories but approaches to a domain that
sets the concepts employed, the way problems are formulated, the evidence taken to be
relevant […]. Scientists have faith in the paradigms they work within” (23). Of course,
the problem here is not “to step over the line of values, preferences and temperaments
that have epistemic legitimacy” (23) and how such a position may resist the possible
collapse between “objective inquiry” and “subjective bias.” Schwartz is well-aware of
all these difficulties, but also of James’s ‘pragmatic theory of inquiry’ which is rooted in
the possibility for philosophies to be valuable and challenged on rational grounds.
5 In the second chapter, ‘The Pragmatic Maxim and Pragmatic Instrumentalism,’ James’s
meaning  of  Pragmatism  is  in  focus.  Schwartz  underlines  convergences  as  well  as
differences with  Peirce  and  Dewey  as  internal  nuances  of  the  common  Pragmatist
project.  The fifth chapter,  ‘Ontological Commitment and the Nature of  the Real,’  is
particularly interesting in terms of its elucidation of Schwartz’s general interpretation
of James’s view. The author argues that James’s goal in his fifth lecture is to “explicate
the nature of human inquiry” both according to his “web-of-belief model of inquiry”
and in support of his epistemic holism. The point Schwartz wants to make here is that
“the very idea of an inquiry-independent, preexisting complete world of facts awaiting
description and explanation is a myth” (79). So in talking about actual inquiry, James
states  that  “knowledge grows in  spots” (James 1907:  82),  and the way in  which the
practice of science develops is  rather conservative.  As far as possible,  preference is
given  to  old  beliefs,  which  sometimes  means  also  contesting  or  even  dismissing
evidence which supports new beliefs.  The meaning of  a  new belief  is  pragmatically
found in the consequences engendered by its acceptance into an older system of beliefs.
This  tells  us  that  science  and the  concepts  it  employs  are living  things  continually
threatening to “expand and contract along unpredictable paths” (80). But then, how
can we explain the longevity of some of our ideas? As is well known, James offers here
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an historical-genetic hypothesis in which common sense, science and critical philosophy
are the three main stages of the historical evolution of human understanding. They are
three  different  ways  of  categorizing  experience  which  have  developed  in  different
times  and  according  to  different  and  changing  needs.  Such  a  hypothetical
reconstruction  should  first  and  foremost  be  considered  as  an  alternative  to  either
Plato’s  world  of  ideas  or  whatever  theory  claims  the  perfect  correspondence  of
concepts  and  the  structure  of  the  world.  James’s  theory  rather  emphasizes  the
convenience of common sense concepts as tools which prove to be still useful in our
dealing with ordinary experiences;  he also underlines the important role played by
linguistic  use  in  preserving  these  relatively  old  concepts.  The  three  stages  of
knowledge, in fact, are continuous since they did not come about abruptly,  but each
one, bursting the limits of previous classification, have offered a new systematization of
experience according to different exigencies. In this respect, to a certain extent reality
is plastic and does not impose too strict limits on our possibility to organize it by using
different  conceptual  schemes.  Incidentally,  Schwartz  considers  James’s  view  of
ontology “uninformative,” just like Quine’s, when he replied to the ontological question
“What is there?” by: “Everything.” In other words, “there is no sensible answer to the
question independent of a background category scheme into which the answer fits and
gains meaning” (81). This is the most interesting aspect of what there is, that is to say
our creative contribution to answering the ontological question. The complexity of our
conceptual systems is mainly due to the historical stratification of meanings: we can
never restart from a zero point, we always have to deal with productions of human
history. Even “concepts and kinds that seem natural are not natural by nature. Their
naturalness is due to their history of constant and continuous use” (81).
6 The author then carefully analyzes James’s arguments regarding the evolving nature of
concepts. These latter spring from our efforts to posit continuity according to practical-
aesthetical exigencies, as we have mentioned. We need both to give a logical order to
reality and to get a predictive grasp on it. Schwartz evidences the distinction made by
James  between  the  development  of  common  sense  concepts  and  that  of  scientific
concepts  in  respect  to  the  issue  of  experiential  continuity.  More  specifically,
considering the concept “thing,” he points out two different ways in which we posit
conceptual  continuity to fill  in  discontinuities.  We may interpolate present and past
experiences, which is the common sense view: everyday objects endure over time and
place;  also,  we  may  have  scientific  objects  which  are  “products  of  analogical
extrapolation” (84). The world of scientific theoretical entities, which are employed in
theories, are extrapolated “beyond the common sense world.” There is an important
point about James’s instrumentalist view that Schwartz aims at making here. He wishes
to clarify that James’s and Dewey’s pragmatism cannot be placed within the realist/
anti-realist dichotomy debate: James is a “Pragmatist instrumentalist” and, as such, his
own  challenge  to  classical  semantics  “does  not  entail  an  ontologically  significant
distinction  between  apples,  automobiles,  and  atoms”  (90).  To  avoid  anti-realist
misunderstandings, James used to define himself a “natural realist.” Nonetheless, the
use  he  makes  of  the  word  ‘real’  is  “contrastive”  and  Schwartz  thinks  that it  is
consistent with Austin’s idea that “the attempt to find a characteristic common to all
things that are or could be called ‘real’ is doomed to failure; the function of ‘real’ is […]
to exclude possible ways of not being real” (85). Already in his Principles of Psychology, he
presented the case  of  hallucinations,  arguing that  assertions  incompatible  with the
“otherwise known world” give rise to our suspicion that something is unreal. However,
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in Some Problems of Philosophy, James pragmatically defines what is ‘real’ as anything of
which “we find ourselves obliged to take account of in any way” (James 1911: 101) and
then clarifies his idea that conceptual systems, such as mathematics, logic, aesthetics
and ethics  are  different  “realms  of  reality,”  each one  showing a  “peculiar  form of
relation” (James 1911: 102). The point is that these systems are not perfectly closed off
or  complete,  but  that  they can interpenetrate  somehow.  All  these  vocabularies  are
fundamental  tools  which help  us  to  deal  in  the  most  agreeable  way with  different
domains of reality.
7 As  becomes  evident,  radical  pluralism  is  the  framework  for  James’s  “Pragmatic
instrumentalist” view, and we can also make reference here to Perry’s consideration
that  “pluralism  […]  is  indistinguishable  from  ‘radical  empiricism’.”1 James  is  a
constructivist,  and  Schwartz  wishes  to  make  definitively  clear  that  Pragmatist
constructivism does not in any way mean anti-realism, not even for theoretical entities
posed by  science.  Pragmatists  rather  enlarged their  definition  of  reality  to  include
perceived  objects,  for  instance,  instead  of  reducing  it  to  only  scientific  objects.
Moreover,  he  argues  that  although  James’s  radical  empiricism  argues  for  useful
discourses to be grounded in experience, he is aware that “in the context of inquiry the
‘given’ is a myth” and holism should prevail. James is not pretending to define once and
for all valuable concepts by reducing them to “experience or reports of observation”
(86). The Pragmatists’ work of the demystification of language, although it challenges
classical semantics and classical copy theories of truth, does not need to establish any
ontology as privileged. In fact, every system of reality has an ontological background,
and ontology has to “work” just by letting its system work. In this respect,  James’s
radical  pluralism  founds  the  difference  between  James’s  “constructivist,  pragmatic
account of inquiry” (87) and the anti-realist instrumentalist picture of a unique world.
8 The fact that different and contrasting systems of concepts exist obliges us to reconsider
our meaning of truth.  Following E.  Mach, W. Ostwald and other scientific logicians,
James insists that theories are but functional descriptions of reality; they are conceptual
shortcomings leading us from some parts of experience to other parts of experience.
There  is  no  ringing  conclusion  possible,  no  absolute  point  of  view offering  absolute
criteria to decide which type of thinking is absolutely true. As philosophers, all that we
can  state  is  that  each  conceptual  system  shows  itself  to  be  more  functional in  a
particular sphere of life, but no one system is completely sufficient under all different
respects; they can be compared in relation to their use, not to any static idea of truth as
a “simple duplication by the mind of a ready-made and given reality” (James 1907: 93).
9 This work perfectly fits the current revaluation of James as a relevant interlocutor in
contemporary  epistemological  conversations,  as  well  as  an  important  defender  of
scientific research and freedom. The book is very interesting also because of Schwartz’s
attempt both to follow James’s arguments and, at the same time, to integrate them with
his own comments and references. Unfortunately, some very interesting comments are
just passingly mentioned but not extensively analyzed. As to Analytic references, some
classical names are missing. For instance, there is only one indirect reference to Hilary
Putnam, as if the author prefers to privilege more direct readers of James, as Dewey or
explore different associative paths. Steven Meyers2 complains about the absence of A.
Whitehead among the authors Schwartz refers to in his book and considers this lack as
a consequence of  the great  influence of  Goodman on his  philosophical  perspective.
Schwartz’s intention to make a selective and very focused reading of those points in
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Pragmatism “which seem to bear directly” on contemporary Analytic problems, in the
line of Dewey, cannot be considered equally consistent for this reason. Dewey’s position
when reviewing James’s work, more than one hundred years ago, is not the same as
that of Schwartz’s today; overall, Meyers remarks that Dewey was cautiously making
some  observations  at  great  length  without  performing  any  decisive  selection  of
contemporary  problems.  Meyers’s  point  aims  at  warning  against  the  misleadingly
precise  and  univocal  interpretation  of  the  history  of  ideas,  and  the  apparently
uncontroversial overlapping of present and past meanings that interpretative issues
may assume for Analytic philosophers.
10 In conclusion, despite his preferences as interpreter, Schwartz succeeds in avoiding to
canonize  James’s  words  in  isolation  from  their  context.  He  is  very  confident  with
James’s texts and particularly convinced of the importance of some aspects of James’s
anti-intellectualist stance. As Schwartz sees it, with James the risk is a vulgar and rather
superficial  understanding  of  his  discourse,  which  must  be  distinguished  from  any
antagonism to whatever intellectual effort to make serious scientific research. James
aims  at  patiently  displaying  –  through  his  restless  efforts  of  demystification  of
meanings – crucial implications of the Pragmatic conception of experience. Rethinking
Pragmatism is  itself  a  work  of  continuous  demystification  of  James’s  words  and
reorientation of references, the same project that its author had been carrying on all
his  life.  One  may  say  that  James’s  beautiful  style  of  writing  has  been  somewhat
misleading for many readers,  because his words seem to be as easily-flowing as his
ability  to  express  them;  but  they  still  require  and  represent  serious  “rumination.”
Schwartz succeeds not only in conveying his ideas concerning interesting similarities
between  James  and  some  Analytic  philosophers,  but  also  in  stressing  the  peculiar
controversies and originalities within James’s Pragmatism. 
NOTES
1. Perry R. B., (1935), The Thought and Character of William James, vol. 2, Boston, Little, Brown, &
Company, 586.
2. Meyers S., (2015), “Prefiguring Whitehead: Reading Jamesian Pragmatism with Stengers and
Latours,”  in  B. G. Henning,  W. T.  Meyers  & J. D.  Johns,  (eds.),  Thinking  with  Whitehead  and  the
American Pragmatists: Experience and Reality, Lexington Books, 58-9.
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